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ABSTRACT
Before autonomous vehicles are able to be widely deployed, a number of se-
curity and algorithmic challenges must be addressed. Current autonomous ve-
hicles that provide motion safety guarantees exhibit excessively conservative
driving behavior when operating in road environments containing highly dy-
namic obstacles. In this thesis we present a contingency-based motion planning
framework for autonomous road vehicles. Probabilistic state predictions are
generated for each discrete action of nearby obstacle vehicles, and multiple con-
tingency trajectories are planned such that safe execution is possible under each
possible discrete action. An online estimation algorithm is used to infer the dis-
crete obstacle action from sensor observations and inform execution-time con-
tingency selection. We present a fast upper bound on a metric of distinguisha-
bility that approximates the predicted probability of correctly identifying the
discrete action of an obstacle from a set of possible hypotheses. The metric is
used to optimize expected execution cost and safety of a set of contingency tra-
jectories. Simulated experiments show that the proposed planning framework
produces trajectories with a lower cost and stronger safety guarantees than that
of prior work, and this performance improvement persists across a range of ve-
hicle and obstacle initial conditions.
Additionally, a prototype system architecture for a verifiably secure au-
tonomous vehicle is presented. The system architecture is designed to enforce
separation of trusted and untrusted information flows. Amap verification algo-
rithm is used to verify external data coming from an untrusted source. Motion
planning and map verification software components are developed with exist-
ing tools that enforce information flow control at the language level. The architec-
ture is implemented on a mobile robotic testbed and experiments are performed
to simulate a remote attack scenario. Experimental results show that the archi-
tecture is resistant to malicious external data, and can operate safely even when
external communications are compromised. Analogies are drawn between the
prototype architecture and hardware and software components on real-world
autonomous vehicles.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Motor vehicles kill over a million people per year and are the leading cause of
death worldwide for people aged 18 to 29 years [38]. During 2013, in the United
States alone, over 32 000 people lost their lives, at a rate more than twice the
average for high-income countries, and 2 million were injured due to motor ve-
hicle crashes. This trend does not appear to be universally improving: prelimi-
nary data suggests that over 40 000 road users are estimated to have died during
2016, a 14% increase in deaths since 2014, despite improved vehicle safety tech-
nology [37]. In an era of cheap petroleum, automobile-dependent lifestyles, and
increasing vehicle kilometers traveled, it is clear that huge steps remain toward
providing safety for motor vehicle occupants and, crucially, the cyclists, pedes-
trians, and other vulnerable road users who make up almost half of road deaths
worldwide [38].
While there are proven measures that can mitigate the effect of driver mis-
takes, such as improved vehicle safety design and the development of safer,
slower road infrastructure, the human causes of road crashes—often speed, dis-
traction, or impairment—show no signs of abating. There is a clear argument
for reducing and replacing human involvement in driving, both for safety rea-
sons and to extend the convenience of automobile transportation to the young,
old, and those with disabilities.
Currently-available vehicles with driver assistance features, such as basic
lane-following and automatic braking functionality, have been shown to reduce
highway crashes by as much as 40% as compared to vehicles without such fea-
tures [3]. However, for fully autonomous driving—or even significant driver
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assistance—in dynamic urban areas, large advances are required in how auto-
mated vehicles are able to perceive and reason about their environments. Nearly
9 years on from initial demonstrations of self-driving technology at the DARPA
Urban Challenge [10], there has not been widespread deployment of any vehi-
cles that allow fully autonomous driving without human supervision.
In addition to challenges regarding algorithmic robustness, as autonomous
or semi-autonomous vehicles become more widespread they will emerge as a
significant security liability and a lucrative target for attackers. Given histori-
cal rates of software and device security breaches, it is almost certain that au-
tonomous vehicles developed with existing design techniques and tools will
be subject to many attempts—some successful—to maliciously compromise on-
board control systems.
Current decision making systems for autonomous cars use overly conserva-
tive models of their surroundings to govern vehicle movement. They generally
rely on simplistic predictions of the motion of nearby obstacles, and even when
sophisticated prediction algorithms are used, the decision making software is
often unable to take advantage of the inherent uncertainty in a well-calibrated
prediction. Simple models of the environment are adequate, and can even gen-
erate safer behavior than a human driver for well structured scenarios, such as
nominal highway driving. But as autonomous vehicles begin to operate in the
varied and unpredictable environments that define everyday driving, a more
considered approach is needed.
This thesis considers two solutions to the above problems. The first is an
general motion planning framework for autonomous vehicles that uses contin-
gency plans to enable safe and efficient driving in the presence of obstacles with
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uncertain intentions. This work considers the relationship between predictive
models of nearby obstacles and the process of identifying obstacle actions from
future observations, and uses both of these considerations to inform the trajec-
tory planning process. The proposed method is applied to a simple intersection
scenario. Even though prior work can provide trajectory-level safety guaran-
tees at planning time, without consideration of prediction structure these safety
guarantees are not valid during trajectory execution. This work is covered in
Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, a system architecture and experimental results are presented
for a secure autonomous vehicle platform. A mobile robotic testbed is devel-
oped, designed to enforce separation between hardware and software compo-
nents of differing trust levels, such as those present in a real-world autonomous
car. In particular, a path planner is developed using language-level information
flow control to allow the secure use of both trusted and untrusted information
after explicit verification and endorsement. Experiments are conducted to sim-
ulate an attack via a compromised external server.
Chapter 4 presents a summary of conclusions and contributions presented
in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
IMPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANNING VIA DISTINGUISHABILITY
ANALYSIS OF OBSTACLE PREDICTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Motion planning is a fundamental component of nearly all robotic systems. It is
relied upon to enable safe and satisfactory task completion by robots operating
in a range of physical environments, from factories to homes [32].
Classical deliberativemotion planning approaches, such as Dijkstra’s method
[16] and A* [27], can produce optimal paths, but typically consider only simple,
unconstrained dynamic systems moving through static, deterministic environ-
ments. Reactive algorithms such as Vector Field Histogram [9] and the Dynamic
Window Approach [18] do not produce globally optimal paths, but efficiently
generate actions to locally avoid collision and seek out goals, while obeying
dynamic constraints.
Most practical environments where robots are deployed are not static or de-
terministic, and this is especially true for road environments, which contain
highly dynamic and unpredictable scenes due to the presence of traffic, pedes-
trians, and other road users. In these environments it is not possible to achieve
satisfactory safety guarantees by assuming a static and deterministic environ-
ment, nor can such safety guarantees be provided by reactive motion planners.
To successfully plan in road environments, the planner must anticipate the ac-
tions and intent of other vehicles and incorporate this information into the plan-
ning framework. As a simple example, merging into a lane autonomously is not
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possible unless it is anticipated that other vehicles will yield to the merging car.
Many autonomous vehicles anticipate obstacle vehicles by predicting future
motion, but importantly there exists little work that attempts to explicitly eval-
uate the correctness of these predictions as the scene evolves. This can lead
to incidents such as the 2016 collision where Google’s self-driving car mistak-
enly predicted that a transit bus would yield as the Google car moved into an
adjacent lane [15]. Some systems rely on a sufficient re-planning frequency to
account for changing obstacle predictions [40], but planning in this way is a
reactive strategy that cannot be relied upon to provide safety guarantees, and
performs increasingly poorly as vehicle speeds increase and obstacles are closer.
Most recent autonomous vehicles generate a set of trajectories from which a
single path is driven [31]. This is analogous to how humans drive: we maintain
multiple feasible paths at any given time to account for different possible scenar-
ios. If road users only planned a single trajectory that could safely account for
all possible obstacle behaviors, then vehicles would come to a standstill during
any moderately complex interaction with other traffic. For this reason, human
drivers and modern autonomous vehicles maintain contingencies—sets of trajec-
tories that account for varying possible evolutions of the immediate road scene.
To enable successful autonomous vehicles, a flexible and robust planning
framework is required, one that produces driving behaviors that are not unnec-
essarily conservative whilst providing guarantees on trajectory safety. To allow
for safe, human-like driving behavior, the planning framework must consider
an obstacle’s predicted actions, much like human drivers do, maintain multiple
paths, and determine the structure of, and inputs to, the planning process for
each path.
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In this chapter we outline a contingency-based motion planning framework
for autonomous road vehicles. A multiple-model estimator is used to infer dis-
crete obstacle actions from sensor observations, which in turn is used to inform
contingency selection. We define a distinguishability metric that approximates
the predicted probability of correctly identifying the discrete behavior of an ob-
stacle from a set of possible actions. The metric is used to optimize expected
cost and safety of contingency timing. The framework is designed to explic-
itly consider the fundamental relationship between perception and planning in
autonomous vehicles.
Our approach is divided into four major subtasks:
1. Motion prediction of dynamic obstacles in the scene,
2. Determination of contingency plan timing,
3. Contingency plan generation,
4. Execution of the resulting plan, including selection of the optimal contin-
gency.
This work focuses mostly on the second and fourth components, and, in par-
ticular, how contingency plan timing is dependent on the method by which the
optimal contingency is selected at runtime. We first present related work on
these subtasks, as well as existing planning frameworks that try to achieve sim-
ilar goals.
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2.2 Related Work
When planning in the presence of dynamic obstacles, the plan is influenced by
the underlying predictions of the obstacles in the scene. There exists a large
literature regarding motion prediction for dynamic obstacles in the context of
autonomous driving.
Carnegie Mellon University’s DARPA Urban Challenge 2007 entry, Boss,
generated a deterministic prediction for each obstacle vehicle, by assuming ve-
hicles will follow the lane while driving in structured environments, and by
extrapolating vehicle speed and curvature in unstructured environments [17].
These predictions are used to evaluate candidate motion plans for safety. Boss
used this planning strategy to great effect during the Urban Challenge, where
the Carnegie Mellon team finished first. While incorporating obstacle predic-
tions improved planning performance, the prediction model was limited to a
single, deterministic hypothesis for the action of each obstacle vehicle, which
does not account well for ambiguous, multi-modal obstacle predictions or even
unimodal predictions with large uncertainty.
An intuitive and principled way to consider the possible motion of a dy-
namic obstacle is to encode the prediction in a probability distribution, as has
been explored using continuous [26], discrete [20, 17], and hybrid [28] probabil-
ity distributions.
Havlak and Campbell [28] employ a road-following controller and use a
sigma point transform to propagate a Gaussian mixture predictive distribution,
using a novel mixand splitting technique to control nonlinearities in the propa-
gation step. This anticipation algorithm is only applied in some basic planning
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scenarios, without any analysis of safety guarantees.
Hardy et al. present a nonparametric anticipation algorithm for road vehi-
cles in [26], based on Gaussian process regression. In the work, the output from
a data-driven model to predict driver inputs is fed through a physical vehi-
cle model to generate predicted trajectories. The algorithm accurately predicts
driver intent when navigating an intersection, but requires retraining for differ-
ent types of intersections.
To plan over the resulting obstacle predictive distributions, a number of
methods have been proposed in the literature. Bautin et al. [5], building on the
work of Fraichard andAsama [19], use vehicle dynamic constraints and obstacle
predictions to find regions in the state space where collision is inevitable with
some probability, then plan over the state space, avoiding regions of inevitable
collision. This technique produces a safe path with probabilistic guarantees on
collision probability, and by using partial motion planning as in [39] can pro-
duce safe paths within a bounded time. However, the process of calculating
the inevitable collision states is computationally expensive, and the resulting
distributions describing these states are complex and difficult to plan optimally
over.
Galceran, Cunningham, and others [20, 14] present a planning framework
for autonomous vehicles, where every obstacle vehicle in the surrounding en-
vironment is characterized by a high-level, closed-loop policy, such as “follow
lane”, “change lane to the right”, or “turn left”. The likely policies for each vehi-
cle are inferred frommeasurement history. Policy cost is assessed by sampling a
policy for each vehicle in the scene and performing a closed-loop simulation, in-
cluding basic modeling of vehicle interactions. This results in a decision making
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framework that can anticipate obstacle vehicles reacting to its own policy. For
example, vehicles are predicted to slow down to allow the ego vehicle to merge.
Although the high-level policies are chosen so they are inherently safe, the sam-
pling nature of the policy selection process cannot provide formal guarantees
on collision probability.
Contingency planning, as introduced by Hardy and Campbell [25], refers to
the generation of multiple plans that correspond to different hypotheses about
the actions of dynamic obstacles surrounding the ego-vehicle. In most urban
environments, planning a trajectory that assumes all obstacle hypotheses are si-
multaneously occurring leads to excessively conservative driving behavior. The
authors are able to show that the contingency planning framework produces
less conservative, more realistic driving behavior while providing guarantees
on collision probability. However, the details of how contingencies are evalu-
ated at runtime are not addressed, and the relationship between perception and
planning is unexplored.
Hardy and Campbell define a fixed initial time interval where the contin-
gency plans are identical, after which the plans diverge. Their formulation im-
plicitly assumes that at the end of this initial time interval, sufficient information
is available to estimate the true obstacle action with a high degree of certainty,
and hence one of the available contingencies can be safely selected and driven.
This assumption is clearly not valid generally, since many different vehicle ma-
neuvers may initially appear similar, and the duration of apparent similarity is
a function of the maneuvers themselves, and not a fixed interval. The result is
that the planning approach is only valid for brief time windows and for certain
initial conditions, outside of which the safety of the generated plans can not be
9
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of the contingency planning system. The compo-
nents shown in bold are the focus of the present work.
guaranteed.
2.3 Method
Notation used in this section is shown in Table 2.1.
2.3.1 System Architecture
The architecture of the planning system is shown in Figure 2.1. An obstacle
tracker processes perception data to produce probabilistic state estimates of dy-
namic obstacles in the immediate environment. The obstacle predictor generates
predictive state distributions for each obstacle at every timestep from the cur-
rent time until the prediction horizon. There are a large number of existing
methods for generating these predictions [26, 17]. The obstacle tracker is as-
sumed to run continuously, in parallel to the planning and control components.
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Table 2.1: Notation used in this section. Unless otherwise indicated, sub-
scripts represent time or time ranges.
Vehicle
Vehicle state at time index t xt
Vehicle trajectory x0:t
Vehicle measurement yt
Vehicle measurement history y0:t
jth discrete hypothesis, or mode h j
Number of discrete hypotheses Nhyp
Prior probability of h j  j
Posterior probability of h j at t  jt
Planner
Contingency start time / planning time tp
Contingency selection time ts
Contingency end time T
Number of contingencies Nconting
Shared trajectory xtp:ts
Contingency plan for h j x jts:T
Set of shared and contingency plans X tp:T
Optimization cost function J(X tp:T )
Optimization constraint function C(X tp:T )
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In this work we assume hybrid obstacle predictions, consisting of a discrete set
of possible obstacle actions, each corresponding to a continuous predictive dis-
tribution.
The contingency planner produces an ego-vehicle trajectory for each relevant
hypothesis about the evolution of the obstacles in the surrounding environment.
The contingency selector is responsible for the runtime decision of which plan
to execute. The choice of plan is driven by current obstacle state estimates, used
to produce an a posteriori distribution over obstacle actions. Further detail is
given in section 2.3.4. The timing of this contingency selection process is deter-
mined by the pre-planner, which examines the distinguishability of the obstacle
predictions—fundamentally, it identifies the expected time in the future where
multiple hypotheses about the action of an obstacle are able to be disambiguated
by the contingency selector. This component is described in Section 2.3.5, and
the algorithmic details of the distinguishability analysis are presented in Section
2.3.6.
2.3.2 Obstacle Tracking and Prediction
In this work we assume that an object tracking algorithm exists which can per-
form measurement association, sensor fusion, and filtering to generate obstacle
state estimates. Examples of such algorithms in the literature include those pre-
sented in [51] [34] and [12]. These object state estimates are used as inputs to the
prediction step given be Equation 2.1.
The predictions used in this work are represented as a set of estimated state
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distributions at each time index, from the current time until the end of the plan-
ning horizon. The predictive distribution for the state xobstt of a single obstacle
at a single timestep t such that tp < t < T is given by:
p(xobstt j yobst0:tp ) =
Z
p(xobstt j xobstt 1 ) p(xobstt 1 j yobst0:tp ) dxobstt 1 (2.1)
where yobst0:tp is the obstacle measurement history until tp. This is a very general
formulation that makes no assumptions on the distribution or model type. Of-
ten, to make the prediction more tractable, assumptions about the distribution
and model are made: for a linear model with Gaussian-distributed state and
process noise this becomes a Kalman Filter prediction. The prediction for a non-
linear transition function and arbitrary prior distribution can be approximated
using Monte Carlo sampling methods.
Obstacle predictions are expressed as hybrid distributions—where the pre-
dictive distributions have both discrete and continuous components. The total
predictive distribution at time t can then be decomposed as follows:
p(xobstt j yobst0:tp ) =
NhypX
j=1
p(xobstt j yobst0:tp ; h j) p(h j j yobst0:tp ) (2.2)
where h j represents a discrete hypothesis or mode. Each mode is predicted
individually—the mode-conditioned prediction is analogous to Equation 2.1.
Each mode-conditioned predictive distribution is assumed to be a multivari-
ate Gaussian over the state of the vehicle:
xobst  N(xˆobst;obst) (2.3)
where the state is given by the following vector:
xobst =

x; y; ; v
T (2.4)
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the elements of which represent x position, y position, heading, and velocity,
respectively.
Each obstacle mode is predicted using a simple road-following controller,
based on the pure pursuit algorithm [13], which gives steering and throttle in-
puts to control a 2-D bicycle dynamic model. Different modes are predicted by
following different road segments. The resulting controllers for each mode are
nonlinear functions of the vehicle state. To propagate predictions through these
nonlinear functions, we use a sigma point transform [49], which deterministically
samples weighted points from the initial distribution, propagates the samples
exactly using the nonlinear function, then fits a parametric distribution of the
same type as the initial distribution to the transformed and weighted samples.
Although this work uses single multivariate Gaussians to represent the predic-
tive distribution, the sigma point transform is easily applicable to nonlinear
propagation of a hybrid Gaussian mixture, as shown in [28]. Techniques also
exist for filtering mixtures of Gaussians, such as the blob [42] and Gaussian sum
[45] filters.
2.3.3 Contingency Planning
The contingency planner used in this work is an extension of the planner pre-
sented by Hardy and Campbell [25]. The planner aims to generate multiple
trajectories for all possible evolutions of the scene, according to the discrete
hypotheses of obstacle predictions, while providing for each trajectory formal
guarantees on the probability of collision with an obstacle. The contingency
planning problem is formulated as a simultaneous constrained optimization
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over all contingencies, given by:
min
X tp:T
J(X tp:T )
s.t. C(X tp:T )  0
where J() is a cost function, C() is a constraint function, and X tp:T is a set of all
planned trajectories, equal to:
X tp:T = xtp:ts [ fx jts:T g
Nconting
j=1 (2.5)
where the number of plans Nconting is equal to the number of discrete hypotheses
Nhyp for the single-obstacle case. In general the number of contingencies is given
by:
Nconting =
NobstY
i=1
Nhypi (2.6)
where Nhypi is the number of hypotheses associated with the ith obstacle, and
Nobst is the number of obstacles.
The contingencies are structured such that until the contingency selection time
ts, the plans share an initial trajectory segment xtp:ts . After the selection time the
plans diverge into Nconting trajectories, where x
j
ts:T
is the jth contingency trajec-
tory.
The cost function J() contains terms penalizing trajectories with high ac-
celeration, high curvature, close proximity to obstacles, and other comfort and
safety metrics. The constraint functionC() ensures that each solution trajectory
meets collision probability guarantees and obeys the dynamic constraints of the
vehicle. The complete cost and constraint function expressions are given in [25].
For the purposes of assessing safety guarantees, we examine the collision prob-
ability of generated trajectories, and we use the total cost of path execution as a
metric of (negative) path quality.
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Figure 2.2: Spline-based trajectory representation. The control points for
the cubic splines are shown as hollow circles. In this work
the control points are not rigidly spaced in time, they are dis-
tributed according to the timing of the contingency selection.
Additional control points are added after the selection time to
assist in constraining the initial trajectory segments to be iden-
tical.
While planning the shared trajectory from the initial time tp until the contin-
gency selection time ts, the true obstacle action is treated as unknown and all
obstacle hypotheses are assumed to be simultaneously occurring. For planning
purposes, it is assumed that after ts the true hypothesis is known with certainty,
and as such each plan only considers obstacle interaction costs and collision
probability constraints that relate to its corresponding obstacle hypothesis.
A spline-based trajectory representation is used, as shown in Figure 2.2. Two
cubic splines are used, for x-position and y-position, both expressed as a func-
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tion of time. Before the optimization is performed, the control points of the cubic
splines are specified at fixed points in time. The x and y values at these points
are the only decision variables for the optimization, which reduces the dimen-
sionality of the problem and decreases computation time. For the experiments
in [25], the authors constrain the first two control points to be identical, so that
the contingency plan has an initial fixed-length shared path segment before it
splits into multiple trajectories, and the timing of the control points are equally
spaced. However, in this work the timing of the contingency selection point is
being studied, and as such the rigid timing of the control points in prior work is
not suitable. We distribute the control points on either side of the contingency
selection time, where the number of control points in the shared or separate con-
tingency segments is proportional to the segment duration relative to the total
trajectory duration. A number of additional shared control points are added im-
mediately following the selection time, to further constrain the initial trajectory
segments to be identical.
2.3.4 Contingency Selection
The process of determining which of the contingency plans should be chosen
for execution is fundamental to the performance of any contingency planning
framework. We term this process contingency selection. In this work, contingency
selection is based on similar criteria to that of the trajectory generation process:
the contingency chosen for execution is that which minimizes the expected cost
of the path, whilst meeting expected collision probability constraints. Note that the
trajectory constraints concerning vehicle dynamics are satisfied during planning
and do not depend on obstacle vehicle observations, so only collision probabil-
17
ity constraints are considered during contingency selection. During runtime,
contingency selection occurs after the start of plan execution, and is informed
by obstacle measurements that occur between plan time tp and selection time ts.
The expected cost of each plan at selection time, based on measurements up
to ts, is given by:
E
h
J(x jts:T )
i
=
NhypX
k=1
p(hk j yobst0:ts ) J(x jts:T j hk) (2.7)
where J(x jts:T j hk) is the cost of the trajectory considering only hypothesis hk. The
expected collision probability of a plan is defined similarly:
E
h
Pcoll(x
j
ts:T
)
i
=
NhypX
k=1
p(hk j yobst0:ts ) Pcoll(x jts:T j hk) (2.8)
where Pcoll(x
j
ts:T
j hk) is the collision probability of the trajectory, considering only
obstacle motion as predicted by hypothesis hk. A tight upper bound on colli-
sion probability between the ego and obstacle vehicles is calculated using the
algorithm presented in [25].
The posterior mode probability term p(hk j yobst0:ts ) in Equations 2.7 and 2.8 can
come from any Bayesian multiple-model tracking algorithm. Here we use a
standard non-interacting multiple-model estimator formulation [4], where each
mode-conditioned estimate is maintained recursively by an independent filter.
This filter formulation assumes that the observed system does not exhibit mode-
switching, which reflects the assumptions made during obstacle prediction of a
single, fixed mode per hypothesis. The posterior mode probabilities are notated
as:

j
t = p(h
j j yobst0:t ) (2.9)
and are updated recursively according to:

j
t / p(yobstt j y0:t 1; h j)  jt 1 (2.10)
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where p(yobstt j y0:t 1; h j) is the mode-conditioned measurement innovation. This
update is exact for linear-Gaussian assumption, where the true underlying
mode does not switch and a Kalman filter is used for each mode. In this
work, however, a sigma point filter [49] is used to maintain approximate mode-
conditioned estimates for each hypothesis, so the overall multiple-model esti-
mates are not exact.
2.3.5 Pre-planning
It is apparent that the expected cost and collision probability of a selected con-
tingency is highly dependent on the posterior mode probabilities over obstacle
actions at selection time. Specifically, if the distribution of mode probabilities
does not strongly support the true obstacle action, then the selected contingency
is likely to exceed collision probability constraints, as obstacle hypotheses that
conflict with the chosen path may have a non-negligible probability of occur-
ring. To guarantee trajectory safety of the complete planning framework, the
timing of contingency selection must be considered before the trajectories are
planned, based on the predicted actions of the obstacle vehicle.
The pre-planner chooses the contingency selection time to be the earliest time
where the relevant obstacle hypotheses are distinguishable to a specified confidence level.
This strategy encodes the intuitive notion that earlier decision making and re-
action is preferable in a road environment, while ensuring that the ego vehi-
cle does not react before it is sufficiently confident in its predictions of nearby
vehicles. The distinguishability confidence level is the probability that an ob-
stacle hypothesis will be incorrectly identified at the contingency selection time,
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which is a design parameter can be tuned to provide desired probabilistic safety
guarantees. Because the contingency selection time must be determined prior
to trajectory optimization, the future distinguishability of obstacle modes is es-
timated via analysis of the corresponding predictive distributions.
2.3.6 Prediction Distinguishability
The distinguishability of predictions can be informally defined as the degree to
which the true discrete hypothesis can be identified from future measurements.
Intuitively, predictions are poorly distinguishable when different discrete hy-
potheses have largely overlapping predictive distributions, as shown in Figure
2.3. In the figure, the distributions are clearly more separable toward the end of
the prediction horizon, and the discrete hypotheses can be distinguished.
Discrete hypotheses could correspond to high-level driver actions—such as
turning left at an intersection or changing lanes—or, more generally, any suf-
ficiently distinguishable decomposition of a continuous predictive distribution.
This partitioning could be based on high-level obstacle intent (e.g. obstacle turns
left or continues straight), by analysis of obstacle behavior (e.g. erratic or pre-
dictable), or by considering impacts on the ego vehicle trajectory (e.g. obstacle
stops at stop line, or encroaches into ego lane). Examples are shown in Figure
2.3.
We define the distinguishability of discrete hypotheses as the expected prob-
ability that, at a given time, the maximum a-posteriori (MAP) hypothesis esti-
mate is the true obstacle action. For the purposes of distinguishability analysis,
the contingency selection task is simplified to a hard classification of the poste-
20
(a) Discrete hypotheses correspond to high-level obstacle intent.
(b) Discrete hypotheses correspond to obstacle driving behavior.
(c) Discrete hypotheses correspond to level of interaction with ego
trajectory.
Figure 2.3: Qualitative examples of partitioning a continuous predictive
distribution based on distinguishability. The red and green el-
lipses represent the predictive distributions for each discrete
hypothesis, equally spaced in time over the prediction horizon.
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rior mode distribution to a single hypothesis. This simplification is reasonable,
as the purpose of the distinguishability analysis is to determine the contingency
selection time—a fixed point in time by which a selection must be made with
certainty. Closed-form calculation of distinguishability as defined above is not
possible; a Monte Carlo estimate is required, where the prediction model and
multiple-model estimator are simulated in tandem.
To reduce the need for expensive and approximate Monte Carlo simulation
of the multiple-model estimator, a conservative approximation to the true dis-
tinguishability is used, where the MAP classifications from the full multiple-
model estimation process are replaced with single-timestep classification based
on the predictive distribution. The classification is “single-timestep” in the
sense that for the calculation of distinguishability at a given time, only the pre-
dictive distributions at that same time instant are used. However, during pre-
planning, this distinguishability calculation is repeated for each timestep within
the prediction horizon to determine the contingency selection time.
Optimal classification of a measurement yt for t > tp is given by the Bayes
decision rule:
h¯ = argmax
hk
k p(yt j y0:tp ; hk) (2.11)
where k is the prior probability of hypothesis hk, and themode-conditioned pre-
dicted measurement distribution p(yt j y0:tp ; hk) can be obtained from ameasurement
model p(yt j xt) and predictive distribution p(xt j y0:tp ; hk) as follows:
p(yt j y0:tp ; hk) =
Z
p(yt j xt)p(xt j y0:tp ; hk) dx (2.12)
When using the Bayes decision rule, the misclassification probability, or error
probability, of measurements sampled from the entire predicted measurement
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distribution is given by:
Pet = 1  
Z
max
k
n
kp(yt j y0:tp ; hk)
o
dx (2.13)
The expression in Equation 2.13 reduces to a one-dimensional Gaussian CDF
for the two-class problem where the class-conditional densities are Gaussians
with identical covariances. In the general case, however, there does not exist a
closed-form solution, andMonte Carlo sampling is slow and does not provide a
definite bound. Bhattacharya and Toussaint [7] present a general upper bound
on the error probability in terms of the affinity :
Pet 
Nhyp   2
Nhyp   1 +
1
Nhyp   1(12    Nhyp)
1=Nhyp(h1; : : : ; hNhyp) (2.14)
where the general expression for the affinity of a set of hypotheses is:
(h1; : : : ; hNhyp) =
Z h
p(xt j y0:tp ; h1)p(xt j y0:tp ; h2)    p(xt j y0:tp ; hNhyp)
i1=Nhyp dxt
(2.15)
The affinity for the two-hypothesis case, also known as the Bhattacharyya coeffi-
cient, is straightforward to compute for multivariate Gaussians:
(h j; hk) =
1
8
(yˆ j   yˆk)T 1(yˆ j   yˆk) +
1
2
ln
0BBBBBB@ detpdet j detk
1CCCCCCA (2.16)
where yˆi and i are the means and covariances of the distributions, and
 =
 j + k
2
: (2.17)
Using Equations 2.14 and 2.16, an efficient upper-bound on the simple clas-
sification error probability between two discrete hypotheses can be found. The
bound has been extended to the multi-class case in [43].
By treating the estimation process as a single-timestep classification for the
purposes of distinguishability analysis, the measurement history is effectively
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ignored. By contrast, the multiple-model estimator that is actually employed to
estimate hypotheses at runtime recursively operates on the complete observa-
tion history. For this reason, using the error probability of the single-timestep
classification leads to a a conservative estimate of the true distinguishability, but
provides a fast and closed-form bound.
2.4 Results
Simulations were developed in the Python language, with cost and constraint
calculations written in C++ to reduce computation time. The NLOPT library
[30] was used for contingency optimization, and the FADBAD++ automatic dif-
ferentiation library used for calculation of derivatives [6]. Simulations were exe-
cuted on a notebook Linux computer. The trajectory optimization took approxi-
mately 30 seconds to complete for two contingencies, although it was not heav-
ily optimized for performance. The distinguishability metric presented here is
not computationally expensive—calculation between two hypotheses over 75
prediction timesteps takes approximately 30ms—and can be readily optimized
further by implementing in fast linear algebra libraries, such as Eigen [23].
2.4.1 Prediction Distinguishability
To evaluate the proposed distinguishability metric, we performed Monte Carlo
trials of the state propagation and estimation process. The evolution of an ob-
stacle vehicle was predicted, according to an discrete action sampled from the
prior distribution. Process and measurement noise was added while generating
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Figure 2.4: Monte Carlo trials of the distinguishability of simulated turn-
ing and non-turning vehicles.
the simulated state and measurements. The multiple-model estimator was run
online using simulated measurements. Posterior mode probabilities from the
estimator were used to assess the most likely obstacle hypothesis. The estima-
tor error probability (the true distinguishability measure) was compared to both
the proposed Bhattacharrya upper bound (Equation 2.16), and the Monte Carlo
sampled single-timestep classification error probability.
Figure 2.4.1 shows the results of 15 000Monte Carlo simulations of the scene
evolution and estimator operation, each over 40 timesteps of 25ms. The x-y
position components of the predictive distributions are shown in the first figure,
where the discrete hypotheses are either straight driving or a left turn. The
second figure shows the resulting error probabilities over the simulation period.
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The estimator error probability is generally below that of the simple classi-
fier. This result is intuitive, as the simple classifier does not consider the mea-
surement history and state evolution, whereas the estimator uses an iterative
algorithm that incorporates time information. The fast distinguishability met-
ric used to inform planning in this work, the Bhattacharyya upper bound on
simple misclassification probability (Equation 2.16), is a much more conserva-
tive metric than the true estimator error probability. Despite the conservatism
of this value, our subsequent planning results show that plans structured us-
ing this distinguishability metric meet safety and dynamic constraints during
execution, while not producing overly cautious driving behavior.
2.4.2 Driving Scenario
Experiments were conducted using the proposed planning framework in a sim-
ulated driving scenario where two vehicles are approaching a 3-way intersec-
tion from opposing directions. The scenario is shown in Figure 2.5. The ego
vehicle is approaching from the left, intending to travel straight through the in-
tersection. The obstacle vehicle is approaching from the right, and can either
travel straight through or turn right at the intersection. It is assumed that the
obstacle vehicle has the right of way regardless of which action it takes, and
it takes each action with equal prior probability. The obstacle vehicle state is
simulated using a road-following controller, with white Gaussian process noise
injected to simulate uncertain dynamics of the system. White Gaussian mea-
surement noise is also added to the simulated full-state measurements of the
obstacle vehicle, which are consumed by the ego vehicle planning framework
for obstacle tracking and contingency selection.
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t = 0.37s
15
Obstacle Vehicle
Ego Vehicle
Ego Goal
Figure 2.5: Driving scenario for planning experiments. The obstacle vehi-
cle has two possible discrete actions, traveling straight through
the intersection or turning left. The ego vehicle must yield to
the obstacle vehicle at all times, while attempting to reach its
planning goal by moving straight through at the intersection.
Planned Trajectories
Frames from planned trajectories are shown in Figure 2.6. Three different con-
tingency selection times are used for planning: at, before, or after the approx-
imate optimal selection time in a minimum-expected-cost sense. The figure
shows the obstacle predictions and the corresponding generated trajectories.
When the plan is generated with a contingency selection time that is earlier
than optimal, the individual trajectories are able to diverge sooner and “react”
to each obstacle hypothesis individually. These individual trajectories can be
less aggressive in terms of lateral acceleration and curvature, while still having
low distance-to-goal penalties, producing paths with low overall cost at plan-
ning time. Importantly, at selection time, the expected execution cost of the path
27
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is much higher as there is still significant uncertainty about the action of the
obstacle. The execution cost is dominated by penalties associated with colli-
sion probability and proximity to obstacles. These results are reflected in Monte
Carlo simulations detailed in Section 2.4.2.
The later the contingency selection time, the longer the initial segment of the
trajectory that is shared between all contingencies, and hence a greater dura-
tion of the trajectory must be planned under the conservative assumption that
all obstacle hypotheses are simultaneously occurring. It follows that when the
selection time is later, there is a shorter period where the planner can leverage
knowledge of the true obstacle mode to generate a less conservative path. In
Figure 2.6, this difference is most visible in the relative final positions of the ego
vehicle between the two contingencies. The difference in position is larger for an
earlier selection time, as the trajectory can diverge earlier to more aggressively
avoid obstacles.
Monte Carlo Experiments
For each of the experiments the obstacle vehicle is simulated until the contin-
gency selection time, at which point the expected cost and collision probability
of each contingency plan is evaluated and a path chosen according to Section
2.3.4. In our framework, prediction and planning are deterministic, so these
steps are performed once at the beginning of a large number of Monte Carlo
simulations of the obstacle state evolution and estimator dynamics. An unre-
alistically high maximum collision probability constraint of 0:1was chosen to
generate interesting vehicle interactions, and is also necessary because the noise
and prediction models used in the obstacle predictor and contingency selector
29
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Figure 2.7: Expected cost and expected collision probability of chosen con-
tingency at selection time, for trajectories plannedwith varying
contingency selection time. The distinguishability of obstacle
hypotheses at the given time index is indicated by the error
probability.
are not well calibrated to real-world driving examples.
Figure 2.7 shows the results of 20 000 Monte Carlo trials each for manually
specified selection times ranging from timesteps 20 to 30 (a 0:25 s range). In
the expected cost results, it can be clearly seen that selecting a contingency too
early results in a selected path with very high cost, as ambiguity among obsta-
cle hypotheses is not sufficiently resolved at the selection time, i.e. the selected
contingency was planned only considering interactions with a single discrete
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hypothesis, but because there remains some significant probability ascribed to
other hypotheses at the selection time, the expected cost of taking any path is
large. A different effect dominates for later contingency selection times, where
the true obstacle hypothesis is estimated with high probability but the trajecto-
ries that wait longer to diverge are more conservative than necessary. This effect
is more marked for the trajectory corresponding to the obstacle driving straight
through the intersection, as the planner can sooner discount the possibility of
the obstacle turning across the ego trajectory, and the trajectory accelerates ear-
lier to move closer to the goal. By contrast, the second trajectory will have to
yield to the turning vehicle regardless of when the contingencies diverge and,
as such, the cost is relatively constant even for very delayed selection timing.
The expected collision probability results in Figure 2.7(b) show a similar re-
sult. At planning time each contingency meets collision probability constraints,
because perfect knowledge of the true obstacle mode is assumed. However,
when a contingency is selected prematurely at runtime, the contingency selec-
tor still has some uncertainty regarding the action of the obstacle, and obstacle
modes that would conflict with the selected ego trajectory still have small, but
significant, posterior probability. As a result the expected collision probability
of the path, as calculated at selection time, often exceeds safety constraints.
Also shown in Figure 2.7 is the proposed fast distinguishability metric, cal-
culated at each time index between the two obstacle hypotheses. When choos-
ing the selection time during the planning phase, we approximate the optimal
selection time as the earliest time index where the predictions are sufficiently
distinguishable to a level determined by a threshold parameter. According to
the criteria for contingency selection—the path with the lowest expected cost
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Figure 2.8: Expected cost and expected collision probability of chosen con-
tingency at selection time, for trajectories planned with fixed
and distinguishability-based selection times. Values shown for
Monte Carlo trials under varied initial conditions of ego and
obstacle vehicles.
that also meets expected collision probability constraints—in this scenario the
true optimal selection time index is 25. Even using a very conservative error
probability threshold of 0:0005 ; the proposed distinguishability-based method
gives a selection time index of 27, close to the optimal selection time.
A second experiment to assess the robustness of the proposed framework
involved varying the initial conditions of both the obstacle and ego vehicle.
Both vehicles’ starting locations were varied along their path of travel, but in
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opposing directions such that they would both arrive at the intersection at ap-
proximately the same time and produce interesting interactions. The goal of this
experiment was to assess the robustness of a planner using a distinguishability-
based selection time against a naı¨ve contingency planner using a fixed selection
time, such as that presented by Hardy and Campbell [25]. Figure 2.8 shows
the expected cost and expected collision probability of the selected contingency
across different initial conditions, for each planner and each true obstacle ac-
tion. The results clearly show that while using a fixed selection time will oc-
casionally match or slightly improve on plan cost as compared to a variable
selection time, the expected cost and collision probability of paths are not con-
sistent when the initial conditions change, and are generally much higher than
for distinguishability-based selection timing. Importantly, safety guarantees are
often not met when executing trajectories generated by the fixed selection time
planner.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents a general motion planning framework for autonomous
vehicles operating in environments with obstacles that have uncertain intent.
The method considers the dynamics of the process by which discrete obstacle
actions are estimated, generating trajectories with a high probability of safe ex-
ecution. These trajectories are lower-cost and safety-guaranteed as compared
to paths from a naı¨ve contingency planner that ignores prediction structure and
the characteristics of the vehicle perception system.
A fast upper bound on prediction distinguishability is presented, which can
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be used to efficiently find future points in timewhere discrete predicted obstacle
actions are able to be disambiguated by sensor measurements. Contingency
selection occurs at the earliest time where obstacle hypotheses are sufficiently
distinguishable. Even though this distinguishability metric is a conservative
upper bound, planning simulations show that even using a very low threshold
on prediction distinguishability generates plans that improve safety and path
quality, while avoiding overly cautious driving behavior. The metric can be
applied to compare more expressive distributions, such as multiple Gaussian
mixtures, with minor modification.
In experimental results, only hybrid obstacle predictions with two discrete
hypotheses are studied. The multiple-model estimator is readily scalable to a
larger number of hypotheses, with computation increasing linearly as the num-
ber of models increases. The distinguishability metric is also efficiently appli-
cable to the multiple-hypothesis case, since the same metric can be used to cal-
culate one-vs.-one error probabilities between each pair of hypotheses, result-
ing in Nhyp(Nhyp   1)=2 evaluations of the metric at each prediction timestep.
Although this increases quadratically with the number of hypotheses, the cal-
culation is independent for each obstacle, and only needs to be evaluated for
each timestep until the distinguishability threshold is reached. Furthermore,
any indistinguishable hypotheses can be clustered together, as in [24], reducing
the number of contingencies that need to be generated—the dominant compu-
tational expense in the contingency planning framework—and mitigating the
otherwise exponential increase in contingencies with the number of obstacles
and hypotheses.
The concept of hypothesis distinguishability is not limited to the case where
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hypotheses correspond to driving maneuvers, such as changing lanes or turn-
ing left at an intersection. As discussed above, discrete hypotheses can be any
decomposition of the predictive distribution such that the components are pre-
dicted to be distinguishable at a future time. Further investigation is required
into how these hypotheses might be automatically generated from a given com-
plex distribution. Automatic generation of prediction hypotheses would also
increase the usefulness of black-box prediction models, where rich continuous
distributions are providedwithout explicit discrete partitioning, such as in deep
learning or Gaussian process based models [26].
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE FOR SECURE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
3.1 Introduction
Our modern world is increasingly populated by networked devices contain-
ing high-performance computing, complex sensor interfacing, and significant
physical actuation components [41]. As systems of this nature become more
advanced and more connected, using current software and hardware design
principles almost inevitably exposes serious security flaws, as recent experience
indicates [46]. Systems such as automobiles and aircraft have significant poten-
tial for harm if they are maliciously compromised, and as such it is increasingly
important to secure these systems against attack.
Recent studies have revealed significant attack surfaces across infotainment,
wireless internet, and diagnostics components in modern automobiles, allow-
ing an attacker to remotely control steering, brake, and throttle [11, 33]. With
the widespread development and increased deployment of driver assistance
and self-driving features [8], in the near future we can expect greater vehicle
connectivity, more sensing modalities, a larger volume of data from external
sources, and a higher degree of automated actuator control. These factors in-
crease both the vulnerability of the system to malicious interference, and also
the consequences of such an attack.
In the computer security literature there exist software languages that en-
force separation of information with differing confidentiality and integrity lev-
els [44]. These languages are provably robust to certain classes of attacks com-
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monly used to take control of cyber-physical systems. Similarly, modern hard-
ware design techniques can produce processor architectures that prevent or
limit any interference between one (possibly untrusted) process and another
running on the same processor [50]. Combining modern information security
techniques such as these at the system design level is critical for ensuring secu-
rity for complex devices.
In the autonomous car example, it is difficult or impossible to completely
isolate networked or non-critical components from safety-critical systems. Au-
tonomous perception, navigation, and control algorithms require data from
myriad sources, such as online maps [1], wireless communication with nearby
vehicles [2], and onboard sensors. Malicious modification of any of these exter-
nal or unreliable input data sources can result in large changes to driving be-
havior. Only through system-level design principles, and hardware, software,
and algorithm verification can these systems be made provably secure.
This chapter introduces a prototype system architecture for a verifiably se-
cure autonomous vehicle. It is implemented on a mobile robotic platform and
experiments are performed to simulate a remote attack scenario. A map ver-
ification algorithm is used to verify external data coming from an untrusted
source. The planning and map verification software is developed with existing
tools that enforce information flow control at the language level. Extensions of
the platform to support more fully-featured autonomous driving are discussed,
as are analogies between the prototype architecture and hardware and software
components on real-world autonomous vehicles.
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of the demonstration system. Green and red ar-
rows represent trusted and untrusted information flows, re-
spectively. Dashed boxes indicate separate physical computing
units.
3.2 System Architecture
The system architecture is intended to represent the primary algorithmic and
software components of an autonomous vehicle: sensor processing, path plan-
ning, and wireless communication. It is shown in Figure 3.1.
The architecture is implemented on a Segwaymobile robotic base, using sen-
sor input from LIDAR and camera, and pose estimates from a Vicon motion
tracking system. The path planner and map verification are implemented on a
Zedboard system-on-a-chip development board. An external map server com-
municates with the Zedboard via a wireless internet connection. Most sensor
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processing and motor control functions are implemented on a mobile computer
onboard the robot (the Segway PC).
3.2.1 Threat Model
The potential attacks that this architecture is designed tomitigate are of the form
where an untrusted hardware or software component is able to influence a crit-
ical driving function of the robot. This could arise where a software component
is internet-connected, or otherwise vulnerable to injection of malicious code,
and is also connected to a critical driving software component. We assume that
critical software components are not able to be directly compromised, although
their inputs may be manipulated if an untrusted source is attacked. In a mod-
ern automobile, such an attack could involve compromising the infotainment
system and thus gaining access to steering, brake, and throttle controls via the
vehicle CAN network.
The map server used in these experiments represents an external untrusted
component, but the security considerations are equivalent for the case where a
local software component is untrusted. If the untrusted software is running on
the same processor as safety-critical computations, a further class of hardware
attacks are possible, including timing channel attacks [22] and other attacks ex-
ploiting shared hardware resources across tasks [29].
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3.2.2 Sensor Suite
A multi-modal sensor suite is used to approximate the range of sensors com-
monly found on autonomous vehicle platforms. A LIDAR sensor is used for
local obstacle avoidance, its measurements incorporated into the path planning
algorithm. Measurements from this sensor are fused online to create an occu-
pancy grid of the surrounding environment, indicating the probability that a
grid cell contains an obstacle [48]. The occupancy probability of the grid cells,
in addition to the lane information from amap, constitute the planner cost func-
tion (presented in more detail in Section 3.2.4).
An external Vicon motion tracking system is used to provide sub-centimeter
accurate robot pose estimates to the system, the Vicon Pose. This is analogous
to a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)—for example the Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS)—receiver that is present in most modern vehicles. Both
systems provide absolute pose of the robot, although an indoor motion tracking
system typically has much higher accuracy and measurement frequency than
a GNSS receiver. For these reasons it is used to also provide feedback to the
low-level path-following controller, although in a typical autonomous vehicle
a more sophisticated algorithm, such as a particle filter [35], would be used to
augment GNSS measurements and localize the vehicle in its immediate envi-
ronment with high accuracy.
A camera is used to detect visual landmarks in the field of view of the ve-
hicle. The landmarks are intended to correspond to prominent visual features
in road environments, such as road signs, stop lines, and other easily and re-
peatably detectable objects in the scene. Such landmarks are expected to be pro-
vided as part of the external map information, to enable verification of the map
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using sensor-reported landmark measurements. To simplify the image process-
ing tasks in our experiments we use Aruco tags [21], robust fiducial markers for
which there is existing open-source detection software. For example, the Aruco
(AR) tag detection library in OpenCV1 reports, for each tag in the camera field
of view, a 6 degree-of-freedom transform between the camera frame and the tag.
3.2.3 Map Verification
An external map server provides the vehicle with a two-dimensional map of
landmarks, lane positions, and other planning information. The landmark loca-
tions are each a single point describing some sensor-visible feature in the envi-
ronment, and the lane information is a sequence of line segments accompanied
by planning cost information (see Section 3.2.4 for details).
Map information is provided dynamically in segments covering the imme-
diate area around the robot. The robot queries the map server for new map
segments when it has moved close to the edge of the current map segments.
While it would be straightforward to save the map in memory on the robot,
given the size of our experimental scenarios, for autonomous vehicles operat-
ing in large-scale environments this is generally not possible and maps must be
downloaded, typically continuously, from an external source.
We treat the external map server or, equivalently, the communication chan-
nel to the map server, as untrusted. In order to use the map for planning, we re-
quire independent verification of the map information against local sensor data.
To achieve this, we assume a Gaussian measurement distribution around each
1OpenCV, www.opencv.org
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expected landmark location, as reported by the map, and assess the agreement
with local sensor measurements using a statistical hypothesis test.
First the test statistic is calculated for a measurement y 2 R2 consisting of x
and y landmark position in map coordinates:
Z =
 
y  m0T 1  y  m0 (3.1)
which follows a 2 distribution under the null hypothesis that the measurement
y is sampled from the expected Gaussian measurement distribution:
p(yˆ) = N(m0;) (3.2)
where yˆ is the expected measurement, m0 is the map-reported landmark loca-
tion, and the covariance of the distribution is assumed to be circular and calcu-
lated as follows:
 =

 + 
m0   xrobot I (3.3)
where xrobot is the current position of the robot, I is the 2  2 identity matrix,
and  and  are parameters to encode, respectively, the constant and distance-
dependent measurement noise. For a given sensor measurement, the hypoth-
esis test is repeated for each map landmark in turn. If every hypothesis test
rejects the null hypothesis (indicating a mismatch between expected and mea-
sured landmarks), thenmap verification fails, and the path planner does not use
map information.
3.2.4 Secure Planner
As a simple abstraction of a vehicle path planner, an A* planner [27] is used to
plan coarse paths, which are then given to a lower level path tracking controller.
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Predefined waypoints along the lane are used sequentially as the planner goal.
The externally-provided map includes a cost overlay, containing a planning cost
for each grid cell in the map. This overlay penalizes travel outside of the lane
boundaries with high planning costs. Both the cost overlay and the occupancy
grid of nearby obstacles contribute to the complete planning cost function. As
the A* algorithm searches for the lowest-cost path, this cost function encodes a
preference for lane following and obstacle avoidance in the planner.
The architecture is designed to enforce separation between trusted and un-
trusted hardware and software components. As shown in Figure 3.1, the local
sensor interfacing (LIDAR, camera, Vicon pose) is performed on a dedicated
computing platform, which also receives pose estimates from the motion track-
ing system communicated over a dedicated wireless network connection. The
computing platform is assumed to be a trusted component. Although the com-
ponent uses wireless communication, in analogous autonomous vehicle archi-
tectures where the pose solutions originate from a GNSS-based system, these
estimates would be local to the system and hence no network communication
would take place. By contrast, the external map server is connected over a sep-
arate wireless connection to mimic an external internet connection, and as such
is treated as an untrusted component.
A difficulty in enforcing component separation by trust level arises when
designing components that use information from both trusted and untrusted
sources. In our architecture, both external map information and local sensor
data are used for path planning. Any output of a component that uses both
these information sources is considered untrusted—the outputs are assigned
the lowest trust level of the inputs—however the input data can be explicitly
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promoted to a higher trust level, a process known as endorsement.
As described in Section 3.2.3, the untrusted map is verified using sensor in-
formation. If the map is successfully verified, it is explicitly endorsed for use in
the path planning computation. If verification fails, the untrusted map cannot
be used in trusted computations, and the path planner falls back to use only
(trusted) sensor information to generate a plan. The planning architecture de-
tails are shown in Figure 3.1.
The planning and map verification routines are implemented in the Jif pro-
gramming language [36], a Java-like language that enforces information flow
control using label annotations to specify security policies regarding confiden-
tiality and integrity. Jif ensures these security policies are binding at compile-
time and run-time. When the map is verified, run-time language-level endorse-
ment is used to allow the map to be considered by the secure planner. By using
a software language that enforces information flow control, we can ensure that
untrusted information does not leak into trusted computations before endorse-
ment.
3.2.5 Robotic Platform
A Segway RMP502 mobile base is used to actuate the system. The base is
statically stable and uses differential drive to maneuver. An existing custom-
developed Windows-based control stack is used for path following, based on
the pure pursuit algorithm [13]. A 2D SICK3 LIDAR is used for occupancy grid
2Segway RMP, http://rmp.segway.com
3SICK, www.sick.com
44
Figure 3.2: Segway robotic testbed.
generation, and a PointGrey4 Firefly camera for landmark detection. The Seg-
way PC, a Windows computer mounted on the mobile base, is responsible for
all trusted computation and information handling, including path following,
sensor interfacing, and wireless communication with the Vicon5 motion track-
ing system. The remote planner is running on a ARM microprocessor, part of a
Zedboard6 assembly.
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Figure 3.3: Experimental setup. Orange circles represent navigation way-
points provided in software.
3.3 Demonstration Scenario
A demonstration scenario was developed to test the key features of the secure
architecture. The scenario is shown in Figure 3.3. A simple loop lane is sur-
rounded by 8 Aruco tag landmarks. Four trusted planning waypoints are pro-
vided ahead of time to the control stack, analogous to high-level navigation
waypoints from a satellite navigation system or similar. The waypoints are pro-
vided to the planner in sequence such that the robot drives around the loop
clockwise. The sensor-only contingency plan, in the case of map verification
failure, is to decelerate the robot to a stop immediately.
The experiments explored an attack scenario where the external map server
4PointGrey, www.ptgrey.com
5Vicon Motion Systems Ltd., www.vicon.com
6Zedboard, www.zedboard.org
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(a) Nominal map. (b) Malicious map. Note the
deformation in the horizon-
tal direction.
Figure 3.4: Segments from the externally provided map. The lane as re-
ported by the map is shown in the brown gradient, and the
true lane center is shown in dashed blue. For more detail see
the visualization legend in Figure 3.5.
was maliciously compromised and is providing inaccurate maps. The nominal
map (Figure 3.4(a)) contains a cost overlay and expected landmark positions
which correctly describe the true lane geometry and landmarks. The malicious
map (Figure 3.4(b)) is deformed such that the driving loop is narrower than in
the nominal case. The landmark locations in the malicious map are similarly
transformed, so that they no longer match physical landmarks.
3.4 Results
Three scenarios were tested to evaluate the performance of the proposed archi-
tecture. In the first, the nominal case, the map server provides a correct map of
lane geometry and landmarks, and the secure planner is used. In the second,
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Figure 3.5: Visualization legend.
a malicious map is served to the robot, and a planner is used that does not en-
force information flow control. The third scenario involves serving a malicious
map to the secure planner. A software visualization (Figure 3.5) was used to
present the measurement and map data used in map verification and other de-
cision making. In all scenarios the robot begins at the lower left corner of the
track, traveling clockwise.
An image from the first scenario is shown in Figure 3.6. In this test, the robot
successfully navigated the loop, as the map was successfully verified due to the
agreement between measured and expected landmark locations.
In the second scenario, the planner ignores the trust level of the map infor-
mation, i.e. it does not check that the map has been endorsed after successful
verification. During the initial stages of traversing the loop, the lane geome-
try of the deformed map is sufficiently similar to the true lane geometry, so the
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Figure 3.6: Nominal planning operation. The system has verified the map
based on the agreement between the measured and expected
landmark location, shown in the upper-left corner of the visu-
alization inlay.
Figure 3.7: A planning failure as a result of the planner ignoring the map
verification result. The malicious map lane and correspond-
ing landmarks are deformed relative to the true lane geometry.
Despite inconsistent landmark measurements, the map is con-
sumed by the planner, causing the vehicle to leave the lane.
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Figure 3.8: A correct planning response resulting from map verification
failure.
robot maintains position in the lane. As the robot passes the curve at the top of
the map, the lane geometries and landmark locations diverge. Map verification
fails, but since the planner does not consider the map trust level, a plan is gen-
erated that follows the map-provided lane geometry. This causes the vehicle to
leave the lane, shown in Figure 3.7.
The third scenario sees the secure planner served with a malicious map.
Again, as even the deformed map landmarks are consistent with sensor obser-
vations initially, the map is verified and driving continues nominally. However,
as the first curve is driven, the landmark measurements begin to diverge from
the expected landmark locations. This causes map verification to fail, and the
map is not endorsed for use in the secure planner. The planner therefore gen-
erates a sensor-only plan, which causes the robot to come to a full stop before
leaving the lane.
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Table 3.1: Components in the system and algorithmic architecture of the
demonstration platform, comparedwith analogous components
in an autonomous road vehicle architecture.
Testbed Autonomous Car
Pose External motion tracking
system
GNSS-based pose solution,
with map-aided precise lo-
calization
Map verification Visual landmarks Multi-sensor verification
of road features
Sensor suite Basic vision, 2D LIDAR Add radar, advanced vi-
sion, 3D LIDAR
Planner Simple A* discrete planner
with cost overlay
Dynamics-aware planner
with contingencies
Navigation Goals Hardcoded ahead of time Generated by navigation
software
3.5 Conclusions
We present a secure system architecture andmap verification strategy for an au-
tonomous vehicle platform. A proof-of-concept demonstration was developed
using an indoormobile robotic testbed, and experimental results presented. The
map verification strategy successfully prevents adverse vehicle behavior in the
event of a maliciously compromised map server. By implementing the planning
and verification software in the Jif language, separation is guaranteed between
trusted and untrusted information flows. Additionally, using Jif forces the user
to consider security when developing software—during the development of the
secure planner a number of bugs were automatically discovered where the com-
piler prevented the use of unverified, untrusted information.
The presented map verification algorithm uses explicit landmarks for veri-
fication, which are largely independent of the lane geometry. This process has
clear weaknesses: a compromised map could contain correct landmark posi-
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tions but an incorrect lane geometry. In a real driving system, verificationwould
be performed with a larger number of measurements sources, using features
that are inherently correlated with lane geometry and other relevant driving
parameters. For example, lane lines or observed traffic flow direction could be
used so that the verification is strongly dependent on information pertinent to
driving behavior and is less susceptible to incorrectly specified landmarks. Fur-
ther extensions of the architecture to a full autonomous vehicle platform are
given in Table 3.1.
In an real-world autonomous vehicle platform there are many more compo-
nents like the path planner, where incoming information flows originate from
many different sources with varying trust levels. While in this work we con-
sider a compromised external server in communication with the vehicle, other
possible attacks such as sensor spoofing can also be mitigated with a similar
methodology, using information flow control and a mechanism for signal veri-
fication. A multiple-sensor map verification strategy is essential for mitigating
the effects of malicious spoofing of a specific sensor mode, e.g. radar or GNSS.
The secure planner is currently running on a standard ARM processor. The
proposed software architecture is designed for eventual implementation on se-
cure processor hardware that is robust to a range of timing channel and other
attacks [47]. Secure hardware is especially critical in resource-constrained sys-
tems, where it is not feasible to have separate processors for safety-critical and
non-critical tasks. In addition to the ARMprocessor, the Zedboard platform also
contains an FPGA for future implementation of a secure processor architecture.
The measurement model used in the proposed map verification algorithm
assumes a simple circular Gaussian measurement uncertainty, with covariance
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that increases with distance from the robot. A more precise model would con-
sider the error characteristics of the particular sensing modality. Additionally,
the map verification process does not consider any negative reasoning about
the absence of a particular measurement, it only attempts to align actual sen-
sor measurements with any consistent landmark location from the map. More
advanced systems would incorporate negative information and occlusion rea-
soning into the measurement model, to reason about expected measurements
that were not received.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis addresses two challenges that must be overcome to enable safe and
secure autonomous vehicles. The first challenge is that faced by autonomous
vehicles operating in dynamic urban environments, whereby planning vehicle
motion without overly conservative behavior is difficult. The second is of vul-
nerabilities in common autonomous vehicle architectures that are susceptible to
remote attack. As autonomous vehicles become more widespread the potential
consequences of a large-scale cybersecurity breach become more severe.
The work in Chapter 2 extends previous work on contingency planning for
autonomous vehicles. A metric of distinguishability is defined as the probability
that discrete modes of an obstacle prediction will be distinguishable at a given
point in time. This metric is used to analyze generated obstacle predictions and
define the point in time where a contingency is selected for execution: the ear-
liest time where obstacle predictions are sufficiently distinguishable. Simulated
experiments show that this planning framework produces safer, less conser-
vative, and lower-cost driving behavior, as compared to existing contingency
planners where a contingency is selected at an arbitrary predetermined time in-
dependent of predicted obstacle behavior. This improved performance comes at
minor additional constant computational cost, and with no change to the com-
putational scaling of the planning framework. Furthermore, clustering of “in-
distinguishable” predictions, as determined by the proposed metric, provides a
principled way of reducing computational requirements. Fundamentally, this
work enables contingency planning to be applied to a much wider set of driv-
ing scenarios, and is a step toward robust real-world implementation of this
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planning concept.
Chapter 3 presents a novel secure architecture for an autonomous vehicle
system. The proposed architecture has an emphasis on separation of hardware
and software components where possible, to prevent unintentional flows of in-
formation from untrusted, insecure components to safety-critical and trusted
components. Where software components must communicate for operational
reasons, information flow control is enforced at the language level (using the
Jif language) to prevent untrusted information flows from influencing trusted
computation without explicit endorsement. The architecture is prototyped on a
mobile robotic platform. To assess security, an external, untrusted map server
used to provide simulated malicious data to the robot during testing, analogous
to how similar data is served to autonomous road vehicles during operation.
A novel map verification algorithm, based on a statistical hypothesis test, is
used to ascertain whether the untrusted external data is in agreement with lo-
cal trusted sensor data. The result of this verification step is used in software
to explicitly endorse the map data for use in trusted computations. In an ex-
perimental driving scenario, unsafe behavior was able to be generated by using
malicious map data without the verification step. With the map verification
enabled, the system was able to successfully reject malicious map data by eval-
uating against local landmark measurements. These experiments represent the
first application of the Jif language to a mobile robotic system. The architecture
is designed for future incorporation of a custom securemulti-core processor that
is able to provably enforce non-interference between shared processes.
Both of these pieces of work contribute to important aspects of the road-
readiness of autonomous vehicles by improving safety and security of these de-
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vices. To the author’s knowledge, the work on prediction distinguishability is a
novel analysis, and in particular the relationship between perception, anticipa-
tion, and planning is one that has not been explored in any depth previously. It
seems certain that this relationshipmust be further developed and better under-
stood before autonomous road vehicles can be considered safe and performant
enough for widespread acceptance and adoption.
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